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Abstract
This Article is concerned with transnational corporations (TNCs) em-
bryonic duty to respect international human rights law (IHRL). It assesses
how TNCs duty to respect IHRL is progressively emerging in the practice
of the United Nations (U.N.) and how that practice may foster and reflect
the emergence of an international law obligation. It also reviews, although
briefly, the main obstacles in the path of enforcing that obligation at the
international and national levels.
A Introduction
National courts often face many obstacles in enforcing human rights law in the
private sphere. There is the difficulty in determining the effect that human rights
have in private legal relationships. With regard to criminal liability, only a very
limited number of states have legislation that makes the attribution of criminal
responsibility to legal entities possible. As to responsibility under civil law, it
can easily become an empty exercise, if the company directly involved with the
violation has no means to bear the costs of remediation, since it is an established
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doctrine of corporate law in most jurisdictions that the owners of a company
are not liable for the damage the company causes (corporate veil). Non-legal
barriers, notably in countries in which the rule of law is weak, include costs of
the judicial process; lack of political or economic independence of the courts;
obstruction of the legitimate work of human rights defenders; and difficulties in
securing legal representation or a lack of adequate resources to legal prosecu-
tors.1
The above dilemma creates vulnerability for local populations facing viola-
tions of human rights carried out in the context of the activities of transnational
corporations, notably in developing countries. It frequently happens that the bar-
riers for sanctioning and remedying such violations in the countries hosting the
corporations are insurmountable. As a consequence, cases had been multiplying
in which victims of human rights violations, allegedly committed by transna-
tionals in developing and the least developed countries, brought suits against the
companies before the domestic courts of their home states or before the courts
of other developed states where those companies are also present. Turning to the
parent company has not been always successful, however.2 These are some of
the aspects of the context in which this Article is inserted.
This Article is concerned with transnational corporations’ embryonic duty
to respect international human rights law. Understanding how that obligation
may be crystallizing and how courts address that responsibility is relevant for
the enforcement of human rights at both the international and domestic levels.
Professor André Nollkaemper explains that an international dispute is based
on competing claims that are grounded in international law,3 and many of the
claims brought against transnationals in states where they are established or
have legal presence are at least in part founded on international law. Accord-
ingly, some courts have resorted to applying international legal standards when
deciding such cases. Furthermore, international law provides national courts in
different jurisdictions with a common ground and language to address the same
type of problems under varying domestic laws, which directly or indirectly reflect
international legal standards, allowing them to cooperate among themselves in
enforcing the same legal standards, to build up an international case law4 and
1 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, drafted by John Rug-
gie and endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011, specifically identify, as a minimum set of
human rights instruments to be respected by business in all contexts, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Guiding Principles. See infra note 14. John Gerard
Ruggie, (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) Rep. on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework at 23,
¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter, U.N. Guiding Principles].
2 Bus. & Hum. Rts. Resource Ctr., Corporate Legal Accountability Annual Briefing, at 2 (June
20, 2012), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org.
3 André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law 9 (2011).
4 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolu-
tion of International Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 59 (2009).
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to foster the rule of law at the local and international level.5
This Article addresses the issue through a very specific perspective and does
not attempt to be exhaustive. It assesses how transnational corporations’ duty to
respect international human rights law is progressively emerging in the practice
of the United Nations, and how that practice may foster and reflect the emer-
gence of an international law obligation to respect human rights. It also reviews,
albeit briefly, the main legal obstacles in the path of enforcing that obligation
at the international and national levels. The terms “transnational corporations
(TNCs),” “transnationals,” “corporations,” and “businesses” are equivalently
employed in their broader sense so as to encompass businesses in general while
focusing on the corporations with activities and interests in different jurisdic-
tions; a TNC is considered a non-state actor (NSA).
B The United Nations as a Crystallizer of International Obligation
Upon NSAs
The legal obstacles to holding TNCs to international human rights standards are
varied and complex. To a great extent, they arise from the state-centred structure
of international law in general and international human rights law in particular,
and the scarcity of mechanisms to enforce that law against NSAs and, notably,
TNCs.6 There is neither an international statute nor a customary rule expressly
setting forth an obligation for businesses to respect international human rights.
There is no international court or tribunal, or even international organs of quasi-
judicial nature, with authority to enforce international human rights law against
TNCs, which remain “at the margins of the resulting legal regime.”7
At most, international human rights instruments may have provisions that
directly or indirectly require states to enforce the respective standards in private
legal relationships.8 In fact, said obligation has been affirmed by the respec-
tive monitoring committees in reference to precise human rights norms.9 How-
ever, the developments in international law described below are strengthening
the grasp of international human rights law on TNCs. And the U.N., given its
unique position in the international system, is a major player in fostering said
developments.
Since its establishment, the U.N. has progressively strengthened its capacity
to address human rights violations carried out by a state or NSA. The reasons
for this are diverse and can only succinctly be viewed here. With 193 mem-
5 See generally Nollkaemper, supra note 3.
6 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 25–58 (2006).
7 Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in
Context: Law, Politics, Morals 1386 (3d ed. 2008).
8 See infra notes 14, 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. treaty-based human rights
bodies, the 1966 Covenants, and human rights committees’ published general comments. See also
discussion of regional human rights courts, infra Part VI. But see sources cited infra note 102; cf.
infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV.
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bers and an “all-embracing” Charter,10 the organization has acquired universal
character, from which it derives a high level of legitimacy to function not only
as an organization responsible for peace and security but also as one with a
responsibility towards global governance.11 Its responsibility in promoting re-
spect for human rights concerns both spheres of competence. At the same time,
the U.N. Charter provides the organization with the necessary legal authority
to carry out such functions. The Charter may be understood both as a constitu-
tion of the U.N.12 and as a rudimentary constitution of the entire international
community, which is here defined as comprising states, international organiza-
tions (IOs), NSAs and individuals. Furthermore, it must be interpreted so as to
enhance rather than encumber the effectiveness of the U.N. (principle of effec-
tiveness), and, by constituting a living instrument, its meaning is continuously
shaped by consistent and coherent practice of the U.N. organs.13
The preamble of the U.N. Charter, articles 1 and 2 (containing the purposes
and principles of the U.N.) and other provisions (such as articles 51, 55, and 56)
contain norms that guarantee the minimum rights for states (prohibition of use
of force, sovereign equality, pacific settlement of disputes self-defence, etc.) and
for individuals (humanitarian law, human rights and fundamental freedoms),
and attention is placed on the latter category. Articles 1(3) and 55 set forth the
ideal that the U.N. must promote respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. In
enacting article 56, U.N. members pledged to take joint action in cooperation
with the organization for the attainment of the purpose laid down in article 55.
10 U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶¶ 6. (stating the organization shall ensure that non-members also act
in accordance with U.N. principles); accord the Repertoire Studies (examining instances where the
Security Council addressed itself to non-members of the United Nations), http://legal.un.org/
repertory/art2(6).html. Further, the Charter has no provision on a right to withdraw from the
organization (in contrast with the Covenant of the League of Nations), and no state has ever been
excluded from it. Indonesia’s withdrawal in the 1960s should be considered void. See Frances Liv-
ingstone, Withdrawal from the United Nations: Indonesia, 14 Int’l & Comp. L. Q., no. 2, April
1965, at 637–46; see also Thomas Franck, Is the UN Charter a Constitution?, in Liber Amicorum
Tono Eitel 95, 96–99, 106 (Jochen A. Frowein et al. eds., 2003).
11 Global governance refers to “a perceived need to foster the growth of multilateral systems of
regulation and methods of management to encourage global interdependence and sustainable de-
velopment.” Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International
Relations 199 (1998). The notion must be placed within a unified and multidisciplinary approach
that the U.N. has been adopting to address threats to international peace and security and to prob-
lems perceived as concerning the whole international community of such magnitude that requires
commonly agreed upon responses (i.e., terrorism, arms trafficking, mass human rights violations,
environmental catastrophes, etc.). This approach involves peace and security, respect and promo-
tion of human rights, development, good governance and the rule of law both at the national and
international level. See generally, U.N. Secretary-General, Reports Submitted to the Security Council
in 2013, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2013.shtml.
12 Georges Abi-Saab, et al., The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (1997);
Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, supra note 10.
13 The General Assembly (GA), Security Council (SC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
Secretariat, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and Trusteeship Council are the six principal organs
of the U.N., which has also established a wide number of subsidiary organs. The ICJ is the principal
judicial organ of the U.N. It was established in June 1945 by the U.N. Charter, and began work in
Apr. 1946. See Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, supra note 10.
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In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly (GA) adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR); and, in 1966, it adopted the texts of the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and opened them to signature, ratification and acces-
sion.14 Together, the three make up for the International Bill of Rights and can
be seen as the materialization of the pledge made by the U.N. and its member
states towards the promotion of human rights. Holding true to the principle that
the practice of U.N. member states and organs shapes the meaning of its Charter,
it is now submitted that articles 1(3) and 55 are furthered and complemented by
the International Bill of Rights.15 Through the reiterated practice of the U.N.,
by the high levels of ratification of its covenants, and by morphing many of its
norms into customary law or to the status of jus cogens, the Bill of Rights has
become binding on U.N. members, and organs, although the specific rules that
arise in regard to U.N. organs, notably the Security Council (SC), are far from
clear. The same rationale may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other instru-
ments of a human rights character negotiated under the auspices of the U.N.
and consistently reaffirmed in its member states’ practices, such as the Genocide
Convention.16
Another aspect that demands attention concerns the partial overlap between
the purposes and principles of the U.N. and jus cogens. This overlapping is not
coincidental because the corpus juris cogentis developed under the influence of
the purposes and principles.17 This overlapping is important because pursuant
to some scholarly opinions and judicial rulings the status of jus cogens seems
to strengthen the potential number of human rights norms in question that di-
rectly bind NSAs.18 To be sure, such peremptory norms have grown relevant
beyond the law of treaties and international responsibility;19 in fact, they are
here characterized as constituting the highest level of constitutional norms in
the international community.20 Indeed, while acts in violation of jus cogens are
14 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967), S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-2 (1978); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, S. Treaty Doc. 95-19, 6 I.L.M.360 (1967), S.
Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-2 (1978).
15 See, e.g., Rep. of the U. N. Comm. on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 20, 22, , U.N. Doc. A/2505 (1953) (statement of Amb. Malik describing
the UDHR).
16 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, No. 1021,
1951 U.N.T.S. 278.
17 Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Com-
munity, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 529, 589 (1998); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional
Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, 1 Max Planck Y.B. U.N., at 11 (1997).
18 See generally Andrew Clapham, supra note 6, at 90; In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 59, 84, 110, 112, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
19 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, ¶ 38, [hereinafter ILC 1966 Yearbook]; Draft Articles on the Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, [hereinafter ILC 2001 Yearbook].
20 Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 Am. J. Int’l L.
55, 55–63 (1966); Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga
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void, acts in violation the U.N. Charter are voidable.21
Moreover, the violation of human rights of a peremptory nature often entails
the commission of international crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), in Prosecutor v. Furundžija, affirmed that the
prohibition of torture is jus cogens and, a fortiori, is “a norm that enjoys a
higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’
customary rules.”22 They highlighted that jus cogens could not “be derogated
from by States through international treaties or local or special customs or even
general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.”23 What
is more, the tribunal held that a norm of jus cogens has effects at the inter-State
and individual levels. The individual level was asserted as the level of criminal
liability, and at this level “one of the consequences of the jus cogens character
bestowed by the international community…is that every State is entitled to in-
vestigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused” of violating
it,24 which is an affirmation of each and every states’ universal jurisdiction over
such violations. But the individual level may well be that of civil liability, which
is corroborated by the case law under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), as will
become clear later in this Article.
Remarkably, the International Law Commission, while codifying the effect
of jus cogens in treaty and international law, refrained from providing a cata-
logue of norms that have acquired that higher status. But the commentary to its
drafted articles suggests some norms have been so elevated, such as those prohi-
bitions against genocide, slavery, violations of fundamental human rights (not
all human rights),25 torture,26 and racial discrimination,27 and grave violations
of humanitarian law, alongside the non-derogability and inalienability of pris-
oners’ rights, and the principles of non-discrimination and equality of access to
courts.28
A word is necessary with regard to the constitutional reading of interna-
tional law adopted in this work, which is drawn from various sources.29 The
Omnes Rules, 66 Nordic J. Int’l L. 211, 219. (1997).
21 José E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations’ a la Carte Problem, 12 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 229, 286 (1990). This concept should not be confused with the supremacy clause in article
103 of the Charter.
22 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 1, 58, ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
23 Id. at 59, ¶ 153.
24 Id. at 60, ¶ 156.
25 ILC 1966 Yearbook, supra note 19, at 248.
26 See generally Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Sene-
gal), Judgment 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (July 20); see also, Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T; The
Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.132 (May 11, 2007).
27 ILC 1966 Yearbook, supra note 19, at 337 (cmt. to article 26); ILC 2001 Yearbook, supra note
19, at 84–85.
28 A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law For Humankind: Towards A New Jus
Gentium (6th vol. 2010).
29 Fassbender, supra note 17 at 529; Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism Revisited, in Int’l
Legal Theory Fall 2005 at 39–65 (vol. 11: Why Obey International Law?); Erika De Wet, The
International Constitutional Order, 55 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 51, 51–76 (2006) [hereinafter Peters,
Global Constitutionalism].
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assertion that the Charter is a rudimentary constitution is not to deny its con-
stitutional character regarding other legal norms found outside the four corners
of the Charter.30 It is submitted that the U.N. Charter provides a constitutional
matrix for the international community, around which other norms form con-
stitutional “networks.”31 Such norms derive from treaty and customary law, as
well as from legal principles. This Article, however, is more concerned with the
human rights norms. Furthermore, human rights treaties, irrespective of their
universal or regional character, may be placed at a different level than general
treaties, and so traditional notions of treaty law may not be fully applicable. To
be sure, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (CCPR), the body of independent
experts tasked with monitoring and implementing the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, has posited that such treaties “are not a web of
inter-State exchanges of mutual obligation,” but rather “[t]hey concern the en-
dowment of individuals with rights” so that “[t]he principle of inter-State reci-
procity has no place,” except in matters of a clearly contractual (rather than
constitutional) character.32 Moreover, many norms found in such treaties have
acquired the nature of customary law and, as has been said, of jus cogens. The
latter clearly places them beyond the law-making capacity of the state.33 It is sub-
mitted here that the human rights provisions of the Charter are furthered and
complemented by the International Bill of Rights and by other instruments ne-
gotiated under U.N. patronage; that the constitutional character of the Charter
and said instruments is shared by other human rights treaties of both universal
and regional nature; and that the Charter functions as a “connecting factor”
that ties different norms together. 34
Furthermore, the Charter attributes different powers to separate U.N. or-
gans, thus enabling them to address violations of human rights on different lev-
els. While the General Assembly tends to appreciate all the aspects involved in
the situations in which it is seized, the Security Council is more concerned with
the aspects related to international peace and security. Together, this practice has
progressively eroded the barrier established by article 12(1) of the Charter.35 For
instance, the complementary roles played by the GA and SC in de-legitimizing
and asserting the illegality of apartheid in South Africa remains an indelible ex-
ample of the importance of these U.N. principal organs in dealing with different
30 See Peters, Global Constitutionalism, supra note 29.
31 See De Wet, supra note 29.
32 HumanRights Comm., Gen. Comment 24, General Comment on issues relating to reservations
made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation
to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant (Art. 19), ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6
(Nov. 11, 1994).
33 Id. at ¶ 8; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, arts.
53, 64, 71.
34 De Wet, supra note 29, at 56.
35 Article 12, ¶ 1, of the Charter stipulates that, while the Security Council is exercising in respect
of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the Charter, the General Assembly shall not
make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Council so requests.
Accord Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) (discussing the distinct and collaborative efforts of the
General Assembly and Security Council).
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aspects of gross violations of human rights. In the last decades, their practice has
evolved so that they have been together addressing violations of human rights
by NSAs, such as terrorist groups, rebels, parties to a conflict, and TNCs.36
Another factor that establishes the U.N. as a unique organization is the cor-
relation between the practice of its political organs and the development of cus-
tomary law and general principles of law. Resolutions of U.N. political organs
may confirm existing legal norms, promote their crystallization, and trigger the
emergence of new norms.37 Irrespective of their nature, said resolutions may
acquire strength in the presence of some specific elements—that is, their reiter-
ated confirmation by later resolutions, and their adoption by a large majority of
states. Both factors may evince not only U.N. consistent practices, which shape
the meaning of the Charter, but also the buildup of state practice and opinio
juris necessary for the emergence of norms of customary law. Besides, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that a customary rule must be assessed
against two key criteria: (i) what states say the rule is, and (ii) states regard for
behaviour inconsistent with their understanding of the rule as a violation.38 U.N.
resolutions often entail both criteria and, as former-President Judge RosalynHig-
gins, noted, their adoption by “an overwhelming majority or by unanimous vote
would surely provide probative evidence of the belief of States concerning certain
rules of law.”39
What is more, by expressly and repeatedly affirming norms of general char-
acter, resolutions may, through the same process described above, trigger or re-
flect the formation of general principles of law. Indeed, by repeatedly affirming a
norm of general character, U.N. resolutions may evince that a general principle
of law has been accepted and recognized, either ab initio or progressively.40 As
Judge Bruno Simma and Professor Phillip Alston have noted, “this process does
36 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998) (demanding that Afghan factions cease discrim-
ination against girls and women and other violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and
adhere to international norms and standards in this sphere); S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 1 (Oct. 15, 1999) (in-
sisting that “the Afghan faction known as Taliban” cease supporting terrorist activities); S.C. Res.
1373, ¶ 5 (Sept. 28, 2001) (declaring that “the acts, methods, and practices of terrorism,” including
its financing and planning, are “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”);
S.C. Res. 1540, 1, ¶ 1 (Apr. 28, 2004) (defining a non-state actor (NSA) as an individual or entity
not acting under lawful authority of any state, and deciding that acquisition of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons, and their means of delivery and related materials to NSAs constitutes a
threat to international peace); S.C. Res. 1572 (Nov. 15, 2004) (urging that all parties in the Côte
d’Ivoire conflict, including the Force Nouvelles, comply with the ceasefire agreement); and S.C. Res.
2098 ¶¶ 7, 8 (Mar. 28, 2013) (strongly condemning armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo for violations of human rights; demanding that they cease all forms of violence and disband,
and reiterating that “those responsible for human rights abuses…will be held accountable.”).
37 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United
Nations, 59 A.S.I.L. Proc. 119–24 (1965) [hereinafter Higgins, 59th Annual ASIL Proceedings].
38 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, 98, (June 27).
39 Higgins, 59th Annual ASIL Proceedings, supra note 38, at 121 (Given its complexity, the theme
cannot be exhausted here and it must be noted that it is under the consideration of Michael Wood
in his capacity of International Law Commission special rapporteur on the topic of Formation and
Evidence of Customary International Law.).
40 Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles, 12 Aust. Y. B. Int’l L. 82, 104 (1992).
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not—or not yet—lead to the emergence of customary law but to the formation
of ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ in the sense of Ar-
ticle 38 of the ICJ Statute.”41 With this background, attention is turned to the
specific resolutions concerning TNCs.
C TNCs’ Duty To Respect International Human Rights Law in the
U.N. Practice
This analysis starts by recalling the preamble and article 30 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which clearly states that “every individual and
every organ of society…shall strive…to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms…to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,”42
and deny to “any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein.”43 Although the UDHR has been repeatedly reaffirmed in the reso-
lutions of U.N. organs, and though many of its provisions have clearly acquired
the character of customary norms, a cautious approach recommends that the
provisions highlighted above have not yet completely crystallized as customary
norms.44 To be sure, the 1966 Covenants have no similar provisions, and some
scholars have plainly denied that the provisions have such nature.45 But the pro-
visions, continuously subjected to the ambivalent U.N., and to state practice,
and to divergent scholarly opinion,46 have progressively acquired a “surplus of
value,” an “element of law” that precedes the complete emergence of a new
international norm.47 Hence, they provide the basic legal framework for the fol-
lowing analysis, which places focus on recent GA resolutions that clearly affirm
the TNC obligation to respect human rights.
The GA has been affirming the TNC duty to respect human rights in recent
resolutions concerning globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all
human rights. Since the 65th session, resolutions in this series contain standard
provisions: “Emphasizing that transnational corporations and other business
enterprises have a responsibility to respect all human rights,” and that: “Recog-
nizes that [they] can contribute to the promotion, protection and fulfilment of
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular economic, social and
cultural rights.”48 The resolutions were adopted by large majorities comprised
41 Id.
42 G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 14, preamble.
43 Id. at art. 30.
44 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25
Brook J. Int’l L. 17 (1999).
45 Larissa van der Herik & Jernej Černič, Regulating Corporations under International Law, 8
J. Int’l Crim. Just. 725, 734 (2010).
46 Henkin, supra note 44; Clapham supra note 6, at 40–41.
47 A.J.P. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law, in 94
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 349 (1958).
48 G.A. Res. 65/216, at 3; ¶ 10, (Apr. 6, 2011).
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chiefly of developing and the least developed countries.49Although significant
members in the minorities, including some countries in North America and Eu-
rope, opposed their adoption.50 Caution is then required from the interpreter
assessing the effects of such resolutions. Isolated, they are mere recommenda-
tions; considered together, they constitute an incipient GA practice on a theme
that is capable of giving rise to a legal norm that binds TNCs. At most, the high
number of favourable votes indicates a building-up of opinio juris in that regard.
Nevertheless, the GA resolutions acquire more strength if viewed in conjunction
with the resolutions of other U.N. bodies.
In addition, the Human Rights Council (HRC), the U.N. subsidiary politi-
cal organ established by the General Assembly,51 expressly emphasizes, “that
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have a responsibil-
ity to respect human rights.” This language appears in Resolutions 17/4 and
21/5, both of which were adopted without a vote thus having the support of
all forty-seven states of the organ.52 Bear in mind that member states of the
HRC are elected directly and individually by a majority of the members of the
GA for a three-year mandate, and that membership is based on equitable, geo-
graphic distribution53 in order to secure the presence of states that represent the
“main forms of civilization” and “the principal legal systems of the world.”54 It
is therefore remarkable that some states unopposed to the instant HRC resolu-
tions were opposed to the aforementioned GA resolutions.55 This provides more
insight into the matter that the UN on the whole, and not just the GA through its
practice of requiring states to respect international human rights, is building up.
Furthermore, the fact that states in opposition to the prior resolutions did not
oppose the instant ones strengthens the understanding that favourable opinio
juris is progressively emerging.
For its part, the Security Council has affirmed the same responsibility, albeit
in an indirect manner and in situations threatening international peace and se-
curity. For instance, it adopted targeted sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes)
49 For an overview of the criteria for attributing “developing” or “least-developed” status to a
country, seeDevelopmentDefinition:Who are the developing countries in theWTO?,WorldTrade
Center, (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm.
50 G.A. Res. 65/216, supra note 48, was adopted by a 132-to-54 vote; G.A. Res. 66/161 (Mar.
22, 2012) (addressing globalization’s impact on the full enjoyment of human rights) was adopted by
a 137–to–54 vote (G.A. Dec. 66/161, annex, XI, U.N. Doc. A/11/1198 (Dec. 24, 2011)); and G.A.
Res. 67/165 (Mar. 13, 2013) (also addressing globalization’s impact on human rights) was adopted
by a margin of 133–to–54 with 2 abstentions (G.A. Dec., annex, VII, U.N. Doc A/11/331 (Dec. 20,
2012)).
51 Article 7 of the U.N. Charter established, among its principal organs, the General Assembly.
Id. ¶ 1. Article 7 also empowered principal organs with the authority to establish subsidiary organs.
Id. ¶ 2. The General Assembly resolved to establish the Human Rights Council in G.A. Res. 60/251,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (April 3, 2006).
52 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 16, 2011); Human Rights
Council Res. 21/5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/5 (Oct. 16, 2012).
53 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 51, ¶ 7.
54 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 9, Oct. 24, 1945.
55 To wit, the member states of Western Europe along with some other groups were not opposed
to the adoption of the aforementioned HRC resolutions but did oppose adopting the referenced GA
resolutions.
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against individuals and entities involved, inter alia, with serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law on the Ivory Coast and in
Darfur.56 The same sanctions were administered against individuals and entities
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the latter case, the SC went so far
as to establish detailed rules; they decided that “importers, processing industries
and consumers of Congolese mineral products” should carry out due diligence
so as to “mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict …by providing
direct or indirect support to …criminal networks and perpetrators of serious
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.”57 This
due diligence includes “strengthening company management systems, identify-
ing and assessing supply chain risks, designing and implementing strategies to
respond to identified risks, conducting independent audits, and publicly disclos-
ing supply chain due diligence and findings.”58 The SC established subsidiary
organs (sanctions committees) to oversee the enforcement of the sanctions by
states. These subsidiary committees maintain lists of named individuals and en-
tities subject to the sanctions. The sanctions committee concerned with Darfur
has listed companies suspected of providing assistance—including the sale of
arms and munitions—to groups involved in human rights abuses, in violation
of the embargo. Once listed, the individual, entity, or, in the case of Darfur, a
corporation, is automatically subject to sanctions that are enforceable by states.
Other resolutions addressing situations in different countries have also adopted
the above mechanisms.59 When taken together, these resolutions constitute a
well-established practice by the SC, albeit less so in regard to the due diligence
obligation. Moreover, the SC resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter and are, per se, mandatory upon states and the individuals and entities,
including TNCs, addressed. It is worth mentioning that although SC resolutions
originally established obligation only upon states, with time they have also come
to create obligations upon IOs and NSAs, which is legitimatized under the prin-
ciple of effectiveness.60
Hence, the U.N. has been affirming, in a direct and indirect manner, the TNC
obligation to respect international human rights law. This reiterated affirmation
of the obligation seems to constitute an embryonic U.N. practice that reflects
56 See S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 7, 9, 11 15 (Nov. 15, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 3, (March. 29,
2005); S.C. Res. 2035, ¶ 3 (Feb. 17, 2012).
57 S.C. Res. 1952, ¶ 7, (Nov. 29, 2010).
58 Id. at ¶ 8.
59 See S.C. Res. 751, (April 24, 1992) (sanctioning Somalia for pirates); S.C. Res. 1907, (Dec.
23, 2009) (sanctioning Eritrea for forces in the Horn of Africa); S.C. Res. 1267, (Oct. 15, 1999)
(sanctioning Afghanistan for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1904, (Dec. 17, 2009) (concerning
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1518, (Nov. 24, 2003) (concerning Iraq-Kuwait); S.C. Res.
1521, (Dec. 22, 2003) (concerning Liberia); S.C. Res. 1636, (Oct. 31, 2005) (concerning the terrorist
bombing in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others); S.C. Res.
1718, (Oct. 14, 2006) (concerning North Korea); S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (concerning Iran);.
S.C. Res. 1970, (Feb. 26, 2011) (concerning Libya); (S.C. Res. 2048, (May 18, 1992) (concerning
Guinea-Bissau).
60 Stefan A.G. Talmon, A Universal System of Collective Security Based on the Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary on Article 2(6) UN Charter 28–29 (Univ. of Bonn Inst. of Pub. Int’l
L., Research Paper No. 1, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962660.
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the opinio juris of many states and directs the progressive crystallization of a
legal norm requiring TNCs to respect international human rights law—either
as a customary norm or, more likely given the general character of the norm, a
principle of international law. On this perspective, the TNC obligation to respect
human rights will not be directly derived from existing human rights instruments
but rather from an emerging norm—a new instrument that may expressly set
forth the obligation.
A question may arise as to whether the emergence of such a principle or
customary norm requires, alongside states’ consent, the consent of TNCs. This
question is reminiscent of the debate on whether corporations are subjects of
international law. The Article submits another notion. Along the lines suggested
by Rosalyn Higgins, TNCs are considered participants in the international le-
gal process but without the same status that states enjoy.61 To claim that TNCs
are on equal footing with states distorts the debate and gives rise to unfore-
seen consequences.62 Corporations’ consent is not required because they are not
lawmakers—least of all in the sense states are—although, they may be present
in the law-making processes.63 This Article adopts a “bottom-up” approach to
assess whether U.N. practice evinces the emergence of a legal norm requiring a
TNC to respect human rights—rather than attempting to derive such an obliga-
tion from a hypothetical corporation’s personhood.64
Perhaps a fair description of the TNC extant duty to respect international
human rights, from the perspective of the U.N. practice, is that it constitutes a
moral standard that is gradually morphing into a principle of international law.
But this Article suggests another description of the obligation. It seems clear
from U.N. practice alone that the obligation is emerging as legal norm. If other
factors are brought to the analysis—for example, the affirmation by the U.N.
of an obligation to respect human rights falling upon other NSAs, such as those
party to conflicts, or the establishment of treaty obligations on NSAs in clear
violation impacting human rights, like those put forth by the provisions in the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,65
and the work of renowned publicists affirming that NSAs do bear an obligation
to respect human rights66—then the emergence of the norm becomes more tan-
gible. It seems to stretch the lines of legal conservatism too far to infer from the
present state of affairs, which is by no means static, that TNCs are simply free
to disregard international human rights standards—especially those of a fun-
damental and peremptory character. That inference is reminiscent of the Lotus
61 RosalynHiggins, Problems and Process: International Law andHowWeUse It 49–50
(report ed. 1995).
62 José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law, 9 Santa Clara J. Int’l
L. 11 (2011).
63 Jean d’Aspremont, International Law-Making by Non-State Actors: Changing the Model or
Putting the Phenomenon into Perspective?, in Non-State ActorDynamics In International Law:
From Law-Takers to Law-Makers 171–94 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, eds. 2010).
64 Alvarez, supra note 62.
65 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197–292.
66 See generally Clapham, supra note 6.
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paradigm,67 the strength of which has been severely undermined in the fields of
international law with the character of public law or, as this Article has been
asserting, with a constitutional character.
As Judge Simma explained in Kosovo, “by moving away from Lotus” it be-
comes possible to assess “whether international law can be deliberately neutral
or silent on a certain issue.”68 Professor Anne Peters argues that a “[d]eliberate
silence is the opposite of a legal lacuna” and that it may imply either a prohi-
bition or an authorization, “depending on what one take’s [sic] as the residual
rule.”69 It cannot be affirmed that international law is inadvertently silent with
regard to the TNC obligation to respect international human rights standards.
The issue was patently present at many moments, such as the negotiation of the
LondonCharter70 or the Rome Statute,71 and conscious decisions weremade not
to include legal entities under the respective tribunals’ jurisdiction—although, it
is submitted, a strong case can be made that the International Military Tribunal
has a very restricted jurisdiction over “groups and organizations” because it is
authorized to declare them criminal in respect to certain violations.72
The constitutional reading of international law onwhich this Article is grounded
requires the understanding that the residual rule in the present case is not an au-
thorization for a TNC to make a tabula rasa of international human rights stan-
dards, notably ones of a fundamental character or those having evolved into jus
cogens. Recall the presumption of freedom as affirmed in Lotus “is a corollary
of state sovereignty and the traditional idea of a state’s priori unlimited regula-
tory competence.”73 This presumption hardly seems applicable to states in the
field of international human rights law and, a fortiori, should not be lightly ap-
plied to NSAs. According to Judge Simma, the Lotus approach is “redolent of
nineteenth-century positivism, with its excessively deferential approach to State
consent” and implies that “everything which is not expressly prohibited car-
ries with it the same colour of legality; it ignores the possible degrees of non-
prohibition, ranging from ‘tolerate’ to ‘permissible’ to ‘desirable.”’74 And Simma
further explains, “[t]hat an act might be ‘tolerated’ would not necessarily mean
67 The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 4 (Sept. 7), superseded
by treaty, Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
68 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 478, 480 ¶ 9 (July 22) (separate declaration by Simma,
J.).
69 Anne Peters, Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?, 24 Leiden J. Int’l. L. 95, 99
(2011) [hereinafter Peters, Kosovo in Lotus-Land?].
70 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, annex, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 280.
71 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, http:
//legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.
72 London Charter, supra note 70.
73 Peters, Kosovo in Lotus-Land?, supra note 69, at 100.
74 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 478, 480 ¶ 8 (July 22) (separate declaration by Simma,
J.).
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that it is ‘legal,’ but rather that it is ‘not illegal.”’75 On this perspective, it may
be ascertained that international law, if it does not explicitly require a TNC to
respect international human rights, it by no means provides TNC behaviour in
violation of such norms with the colour of legality. At most, it can be said that
such behaviour is tolerated. An international norm expressly requiring TNCs to
respect international human rights law has not completely emerged yet, making
it difficult to bluntly affirm that TNCs are prohibited from adopting behaviour
contrary to that law. However, that norm is in the developmental process and
has in it already an element of law, so it can be argued that such behaviour is “not
legal.” When fully crystallized, either as a principle or a custom, the norm will
clarify and affix the illegality of TNC behaviour that is contrary to international
human rights law. That said, the TNC legal obligation to respect fundamental
human rights with mandatory character, if it has not yet fully materialized, is
very close to doing so.
But the obligation, if and when plainly established, will require a matu-
ration of its scope and the development of enforcement mechanisms before it
can become fully operational. The next sections show both that there has been
progress in identifying the minimum content of corporations’ duty to respect hu-
man rights, as well as address some of the difficulties in enforcing corporations’
responsibility for violation of international human rights.
D U.N. Human Rights Bodies
The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have also played important roles in fostering the
development of the topic by asserting the states’ responsibilities to enforce hu-
man rights in the private sphere, thereby providing an authoritative reading of
the 1966 Covenants that may serve to promote the determination of the scope
of the TNC obligation to respect human rights, as explained below. In 1999,
the CESCR promulgated General Comment 12 on the right to adequate food,
in which it declared:
While only States are parties to the Covenant and are thus ulti-
mately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society—
individuals, families, local communities, non-governmental organi-
zations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business
sector—have responsibilities in the realization of the right to ade-
quate food. […] The private business sector—national and transnational—
should pursue its activities within the framework of a code of con-
duct conducive to respect of the right to adequate food, agreed upon
jointly with the Government and civil society.76
75 Id. at 480–81, ¶ 9.
76 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food,
(Art. 11), ¶ 20 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
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The above statement is unique in that it explicitly calls for NSAs to respect
the human right to food. More often, however, the human rights bodies call on
states to enforce human rights in the private sphere. Indeed, General Comment
20 of the CESCR ascertained:
Discrimination is frequently encountered in families, workplaces,
and other sectors of society. For example, actors in the private hous-
ing sector (e.g. private landlords, credit providers and public housing
providers) may directly or indirectly deny access to housing or mort-
gages on the basis of ethnicity, marital status, disability or sexual
orientation while some families may refuse to send girl children to
school. States parties must therefore adopt measures, which should
include legislation, to ensure that individuals and entities in the pri-
vate sphere do not discriminate on prohibited grounds.77
Similarly, inGeneral Comment 34 theHumanRights Committee determined:
The obligation also requires States parties to ensure that persons are
protected from any acts by private persons or entities that would
impair the enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion and expression to
the extent that these Covenant rights are amenable to application
between private persons or entities.78
This notion—that while provisions in human rights treaties are not directly
applicable to NSA, states have the obligation to enforce them in the private
sphere—constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the 1966Covenants, which,
as seen, furthers and complements the Charter, thus providing the U.N. with the
necessary legal grounds on which to progressively assert the scope of the TNC
obligation to respect international human rights law. The same notion can also
be found in the general comments or recommendations of other U.N. treaty-
based human rights bodies, and in decisions of regional systems of human rights
(see discussion below).79 In these jurisdictions, the line between moral and legal
77 Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in
economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, ¶ 2) ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
78 Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression (Art. 19), ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CG/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
79 There are ten U.N. treaty-based human rights bodies. In addition to the CCPR and the ICE-
SCR, others include the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee Against Tor-
ture (CAT), the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) the Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CED), and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED). See, e.g., Comm.
Against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev. 4 (Nov. 23, 2007); Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, General recommendation No. 32: The meaning and scope of special measures in the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/GC/32 (Seventy-fifth session, Aug. 2009); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, General recommendation No. 19: Violence against women, ¶¶ 9, 24(a), U.N. Doc.
A/47/38 (Eleventh session, 1992); and Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft Gen-
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duties is also very blurred. It is submitted here that the call upon states to en-
force human rights in the private sphere constitutes, indirectly, an affirmation
that such rights must be respected by NSAs. Hence, it may be interpreted as
an indirect affirmation of the corporations’ duty to respect the human rights in
question.
E UN Special Procedures
This Article affirms that the International Bill of Rights furthers and comple-
ments the Charter, providing normative content to the general provisions in the
Charter that demand respect to human rights. As an obligation upon TNCs to
respect human rights develops under the auspices of the U.N., it is natural that
the Bill of Rights will provide the minimum content of the obligation. This no-
tion has been corroborated by the outcome of work done by John Ruggie as U.N.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises in his 2011 publica-
tion: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.80
The U.N. Guiding Principles contains thirty-one principles organized under
three main headings: Protect, Respect and Remedy. Businesses’ duty to respect
is subject to the second cluster of principles. Principle 11 sets forth the propo-
sition that: “Business enterprises should respect human rights.” Meaning that,
“they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”81 Commentary to
this principle highlights that such responsibility “exists independently of States’
abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations.”82 In
what concerns the content of the obligation, it is principle 12 that stands out by
setting forth that:
The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights
refers to internationally recognized human rights—understood, at
a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human
Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in
the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work.83
Besides, the commentary to principle 12 makes express reference to the In-
ternational Labour Organization’s (ILO) eight core conventions concerning free-
dom of association and effective recognition of the rights to collective bargain-
eral comment on Article 12 of the Convention: Equal Recognition before the Law, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/11/4 (Nov. 25, 2013).
80 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 1.
81 Id. at 13
82 Id.
83 Id. (emphasis added).
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ing,84 the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour,85 the effec-
tive abolition of child labour,86 and the elimination of discrimination in respect
of employment and occupation.87 Finally, the same commentary expressly in-
cludes the rights of indigenous peoples; women; national, ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities; children; persons with disabilities; and migrant workers
and their families.88
Another aspect that deserves mentioning concerns the TNC obligation to
carry out human rights due diligence (HRDD), as is detailed in the Guiding
Principles numbers 17 thru 21, so as to “identify, prevent, mitigate and account
for how they [TNCs] address their adverse human rights impacts …The process
should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrat-
ing and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how
impacts are addressed.”89
Due diligence must tackle the human rights impacts that businesses may
cause both directly and indirectly, including those caused by factors connected
to business operations, products, services and relationships.90 The obligation
should be consistent with the complexity and size of the business and with the
risk of serious human rights violations and the nature and context of the busi-
ness’s activities.91 It should be continuously carried out, given that the potential
risks involved may change.92 The due diligence must rely on human rights ex-
pertise and involve “meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups
and other relevant stakeholders.”93 The outcome of the due diligence must be
incorporated “across relevant internal functions and processes,” including the
relevant decision-making, budget allocations and oversight processes; and ap-
propriate action must be carried out.94 Principles 20 and 21 provide directives
for the assessment of whether the human rights impacts identified in the due
84 International Labour Organization Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organize, July 4, 1950, ILO No. 87, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; Convention concerning
the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 18, 1951,
ILO No. 98, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
85 International Labour Organization Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour,
May, 1, 1932, ILONo. 29, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour),
January 17, 1959, ILO No. 105, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
86 International Labour Organization Convention concerning the Minimum Age for Admission
to Employment, June 19, 1976, ILO No. 138, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297; Convention concerning the Pro-
hibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, November
19, 2000, ILO No. 182, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
87 International Labour Organization Convention 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, May, 23, 1953, ILO No. 100, 165 U.N.T.S. 303;
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 15, 1958,
ILO No. 111, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
88 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 13–14, princ. 12, cmt. Accord the eight ILO con-
ventions, discussed supra notes 84–87.
89 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 15–17.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 18–19.
93 Id. at 19, princ. 18(b).
94 Id. at 20, princ. 19.
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diligence have been properly addressed.95
Note how human rights due diligence was addressed both by the Security
Council and the Special Representative, and how one complements and strength-
ens the other. Furthermore, the importance of carrying out due diligence may
be enhanced by the multiplication of the so-called codes of conduct. Voluntary
in essence, these collegiate or individually produced codes are usually the result
of fragmented efforts carried out independent of each other, with rare excep-
tions, such as ISO 26000.96 The content and level of detail of such efforts varies
hugely, but the level of importance, for the present purposes, stays the same in
shaping the general standards of care that are legally expected from businesses.97
As standards of care for a sector of business or industrial activity are improved,
meeting them may require, in specific circumstances, the carrying out of human
rights due diligence.98
The outcomes of the efforts of two other organizations must be mentioned
here because they strengthen the U.N. guiding principles: namely, the ILO’s tri-
partite principles, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment’s OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.99
The ILO is characterized by its unique tripartite structure that brings to-
gether in its executive bodies representatives of states, employers, and workers.
It adopted its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational En-
terprises in 1977, and the publication was last updated in 2006. This instrument
clearly states that all of its parties “should respect the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the Constitution of the In-
ternational Labour Organization and its principles according to which freedom
of expression and association are essential to sustained progress.”100 Further-
more, the parties should “contribute to the realization of the ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up.”101 On its
turn, the OECD in chapter IV of its 2011 Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
95 Id. at 22–24.
96 Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO Doc. 2600: 2010,
(Nov. 1, 2010), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en.
97 David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Respon-
sibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931, 955–958 (2004).
98 A good example is The Kimberley Process, a joint venture involving states and non-state
actors with the aim of stemming out “the flow of conflict diamonds—rough diamonds used by
rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments.” The Kimberley Process, http:
//www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Nov. 25,2015). The initiative has the pull of the U.N.,
cf., e.g., S.C. Res. 1306 (July 5, 2000) (prohibiting the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds
from Sierra Leone), and G.A. Res. 55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001) (resolving to break the link between rough
diamonds and armed conflict), with G.A. Res. 61/28 (Feb. 12, 2007) (report of the Chair of the
Kimberley Process). The Chair rotates annually; in 2007, it was the European Union.
99 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises (1976), 15 I.L.M. 967–79 (6th ed., 2011) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
100 International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises and Social Policy, Nov. 16, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 422, at ¶¶ 8, 48 (4th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter MNE Declaration].
101 International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M.1233 (rev. ed., 2010).
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prises, set forth the idea that enterprises should: “Respect human rights, which
means they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”102 Com-
mentary to this guideline emphasizes that “[i]n all cases and irrespective of the
country or specific context of enterprises’ operations, reference should be made
at a minimum to the internationally recognised human rights expressed in the
International Bill of Human Rights …and to the principles concerning funda-
mental rights set out in the 1998 International Labour Organization Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”103 It is important to observe
that the OECD guidelines also affirm that businesses should “[c]arry out hu-
man rights due diligence as appropriate to their size, the nature and context of
operations and the severity of the risks of adverse human rights impacts.”104
Gradually, agreement caused a build-up in strength, so that now the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights and the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work contain the minimum human rights standards that businesses
are required to respect. Also, the obligation to carry out human rights due dili-
gence is being progressively reinforced. The focus placed on said instruments
should not be understood as undermining the principle that “all human rights are
universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”105
Rather, it should be seen as a starting point. Remarkably, the U.N.Guiding Prin-
ciples and the OECD Guidelines jointly emphasize that businesses may impact
on the “entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights,” and each
expressly lists, along with the above, other human rights standards.106 Further-
more, explaining the normative contribution of the Guiding Principles—and his
explanation may equally apply to the other two instruments—UN Special Rep-
resentative John Ruggie asserted that it consisted:
[N]ot in the creation of new international law obligations but in
elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for
States and businesses; integrating them within a single, logically co-
herent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the cur-
rent regime falls short and how it should be improved.107
The clear import from the above is that the maturation of the scope of the TNC
obligation to respect human rights derives from two different and complemen-
tary approaches. On the one hand, there is an inductive approach based on the
repeated affirmation of the TNC obligation to respect precise human rights stan-
dards in specific cases. This can be a very slow process indeed, but its outcome
102 OECD Guidelines, supra note 99, at 31, ¶ 1.
103 Id. at 32, ¶ 39.
104 Id. at 31, ¶ 5.
105 G.A. Res. 66/151, (Mar. 13, 2012), U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/151 at 2 ¶ 1.
106 Cf. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4 at 13, princ. 12 cmt. (“Because business enterprises can
have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights”), with
OECDGuidelines, supra note 99, at 32, ¶ 40 (“Enterprises can have an impact on virtually the entire
spectrum of internationally recognised human rights.”).
107 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 5, ¶ 14.
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is solid because the resulting obligations are precise, seasoned, and very tangi-
ble.108 On the other hand, there is a deductive approach that attempts to derive
human rights obligations upon TNCs from existing international instruments
entered into by and among member states. This is a faster process, but weaker
when contrasted with the former. All in all, the compilation of standards in
the Guiding Principles constitutes recommendations offered to the international
community. They were endorsed by the HRC in Resolution 17/4, which, as has
been seen, was adopted with support by all forty-seven members. What this sug-
gests is that the non-mandatory nature of U.N. principles does not prevent them
from providing scope for the evolving TNC obligation to respect international
human rights law.
F Regional Human Rights Courts
This section will briefly review the very important contribution to human rights
the courts have been making to the development in the field. The main regional
courts—the Inter-American (IACtHR) and the European (ECtHR) Courts of Hu-
man Rights—have played an important role in holding states to their obliga-
tion to ensure respect for human rights in the private sphere and their case law
strengthens and complements the work of the U.N. human rights bodies and pro-
cedures. By way of illustration, it can be recalled that the ECtHR has held states
responsible for failing to protect against violations of the right to privacy by me-
dia organizations.109 Professor Andrew Clapham has cited many such instances
in which the European court held states responsible for failing to protect against
violations committed by NSAs, corporations included.110 The same applies to
the IACtHR. In Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, for instance, the Inter-American court
ruled that: “States must regulate and supervise all activities related to the health
care given to the individuals under the jurisdiction thereof, as a special duty to
protect life and personal integrity, regardless of the public or private nature of
the entity giving such health care.”111 The judges concluded that failure to do
so would give rise to international liability.112 In an opinion on a case involving
migrant workers, the IACtHR placed the principle of non-discrimination among
jus cogens norms, affirmed that it constituted an obligation erga omnes, and held
that it applied in the private sphere.113
Furthermore, there is a set of cases heard by the IACtHR deserving of spe-
cial attention, given their importance in standing for the notion of human rights
108 This is reminiscent of the “coutume sage” referenced by Judge Bruno Simma and Professor
Phillip Alston, supra note 40, at 89.
109 Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
110 Clapham, supra note 6, at 317–42.
111 Ximenes-Lopez v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 149, 1, 28, ¶ 89 (Jul. 4, 2006). (emphasis added).
112 Id. at ¶ 90.
113 Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC–18/03, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 98, 101 (Sept. 17, 2003).
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due diligence.114 These cases concern the exploitation by private companies of
lands claimed by indigenous communities. These decisions are important for
different reasons—first, for holding states responsible for failing to prevent and
remedy abuses committed by private corporations; second, for providing a new
insight into the communitarian aspects of right to property under article 21 of
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and finally for promoting the
understanding of the relationship between development and human rights. But
the aspect now emphasized concerns the affirmation of the communities’ right to
participate in the decision-making concerning the exploration of their land. This
is emphasized because it exposes another aspect of the obligation to carry out hu-
man rights due diligence. One example illustrates the point. In 2012, the ICtHR
decided Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador.115 At stake were the
mechanisms of protection necessary to guarantee the right to communal prop-
erty. In the case, lands had been licensed by the state to a private oil company,
whose activities severely impacted the lives of the Kichwa community. The court
emphasized that there were guidelines that had to be respected whenever states
imposed limitations and restrictions on indigenous peoples’ rights to exercise
use over their lands, for the purposes of exploring and extracting their natural
resources. It held that exploration and extraction of natural resources could not
jeopardize the survival of the indigenous people. Notably, the court suggested
that safeguards should be applied through the implementation of participatory
processes that guarantee the efficacy of the right to consultation, particularly in
the face of large-scale investments.116 To strengthen the rights of affected pop-
ulations in this way, it is submitted, is to strengthen the corporate obligation to
carry out human rights due diligence. This conclusion is reinforced by the afore-
mentioned U.N. Guiding Principles, specifically principle 18, and the OECD
Guidelines.
It is clear that regional courts of human rights had already been corrobo-
rating the notion that human rights must be respected in the private sphere by
affirming precise obligations in the cases they heard. They clearly relied on new
readings of international human rights treaties, readings that were more con-
sonant to the constitutional rather than contractual nature of such treaties.117
Hence, the U.N. efforts in this field should be understood in the context of the
114 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Prelim-
inary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172
(Nov. 28, 2007).
115 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
116 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 157 (Mar. 29, 2006).
117 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 146–7 (Aug. 31, 2001) (the court observed that terms
of international human rights treaties have an autonomous meaning, and that such “treaties are
live instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of times and …to current living
conditions.” The court opined that there should be no restrictive interpretation of human rights, pur-
suant to article 29 (b) of the American Convention). Id.; Accord Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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larger picture provided by the decisions of these two human rights courts.
G Some Legal Barriers for the Enforcement of the TNC Obligation
to Respect IHRL
There are many barriers in the path of judicial enforcement of the TNC obli-
gation to respect human rights, although this latter field has been developing
along with the former. As said, there are no international courts with jurisdic-
tion to oversee TNC compliance with international human rights norms. Re-
gional human rights courts and international criminal courts and tribunals are
capable of only indirectly enforcing international human rights standards against
TNCs. This is done, respectively, by holding states responsible for violations
carried out in the private legal relations and holding businesspeople responsi-
ble for crimes that involve serious violations of human rights. Criminal law in
particular should not be taken as a panacea for “solving theoretical and prac-
tical obstacles surrounding the debate on corporate human rights obligations”
because it only sanctions the “most serious” violations of fundamental human
rights norms, all having the character of jus cogens.118 As there is no perception
that any of the above will change in the near future, attention naturally turns to
the role of national courts, notably those in countries where the TNCs are incor-
porated or have an established presence. In this regard, the U.S. federal courts
have been unique in holding TNCs civilly liable for violations of international
human rights standards. These cases have been heard by U.S. courts under the
Alien Torts Claims Act, and although the case law seems far from firmly estab-
lished in many aspects, there has been a clear inclination toward affirming the
TNC responsibility to respect fundamental international human rights norms.
The ATCA was originally part of the 1789 Judiciary Act and is currently
enshrined in section 1350 of the twenty-eighth title to the United States Code,
where it reads—“the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.”119 Resort to the ATCA remained very uncommon
for almost two centuries.120 Its modern application started in 1980 with Filár-
tiga v. Peña-Irala, a case that concerned torture committed by a Paraguayan
state agent against Paraguayan nationals, all of whom were living in the United
States.121 The conviction of the agent by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit opened the door for attempts to apply the ATCA in cases
of violations of international human rights law by government agents. In the
118 Herik & Černič, Regulating Corporations under International Law, supra note 45, at 742.
119 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2012) (corresponds to the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), 1
Stat. 79, n. 10).
120 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Tort Liability for Human Rights Abuses 9 (2008) (“The
ATCA evolved from a footnote to the Judiciary Statute of 1789 into an institution recognized in
1980 as a primary arena for litigating human rights.”) The ATCA is also sometimes referred to as
the Alien Torts Statute, or the ATS. This latter construct entered the law in the United States Supreme
Court’s major pronouncement on the meaning of the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004).
121 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2016 Droubi: Transnational Corps. and Int’l Human Rights Law 141
1990s, suits were brought against corporations, too, on the grounds that they
had facilitated the commission of crimes by foreign governments.122 Dozens of
cases were brought against TNCs, most of which concerned corporate respon-
sibility as aiders and abettors in violations of international law.123 The lawsuits
alleged: “heinous crimes condemned by customary international law” that “took
place abroad and in troubled or chaotic circumstances.”124 Illustrative cases were
brought against companies that provided the “Agent Orange” for the U.S. gov-
ernment to deploy in Vietnam;125 that were allegedly complicit in the forced
labour, rape, and murder of Burmese villagers;126 that were accused of complic-
ity with the government in committing human rights abuses including murder,
against local communities in Nigeria.127 The complexity of the cases along with
TNCs perception of the risk of multibillion-dollar verdicts being awarded has led
many TNCs to settle cases before trial.128 Hence, the federal courts of appeals
have had the opportunity to decide no more than a handful of such cases, and
the United States Supreme Court has had only two.129 Consequently, a number
of “unresolved issues” remain in the ATCA’s jurisprudence.130 This section is
less concerned with such issues, however, than with the overall impact that the
few decisions have had in promoting the development of the law in regard to
the TNC obligation to respect international human rights standards.
However significant, the impact of these decisions should not be overstated.
This is because, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, courts
are required, when recognizing causes of action under the ATCA, to exercise
“vigilant doorkeeping”131 and, therefore, “should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when Section 1350 was enacted.”132 The Court’s ruling sets
forth the requirements for an international norm to trigger federal court jurisdic-
tion under the ATCA. Namely, it must be specific, universal, and have manda-
tory character. Hence, it is understandable that many courts have emphasized
the norms under which they recognize causes of action to have the character of
jus cogens and, in so doing, clearly place them under the Alvarez umbrella.133
122 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), and Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Ca. 2000) aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Doe I v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932
(9th Cir. 2002), granted rehearing en banc by Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated on rehearing by John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
123 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at ¶ 29.
124 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013).
125 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, Vietnam
Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
126 Doe I, 395 F.3d 932.
127 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.
128 Id. at 117.
129 Sosa v. Alvarez, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
130 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
131 Alvarez, 542 U.S. at 729.
132 Id. at 732.
133 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Doe I
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Take the 2003 ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Talisman.134 In what became a well-known obiter dictum,
Judge Schwartz noted:
[S]ubstantial international and United States precedent indicates that
corporations may also be held liable under international law, at least
for gross human rights violations. Extensive Second Circuit prece-
dent further indicates that actions under the ATCA against corpo-
rate defendants for such substantial violations of international law,
including jus cogens violations, are the norm rather than the excep-
tion.135
But the question of whether corporations can be held liable for violations
of international human rights law soon appeared ripe for adjudication. For the
most part, the district courts affirmed that possibility.136 However, the Second
Circuit overturned many of those cases on appeal,137 deciding, for example, in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum that “corporate liability is not a norm that
we can recognize and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary
international law of human rights does not impose any form of liability on cor-
porations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).”138 The reasoning for that holding is
long and complex, and its review is beyond the scope of this Article. Neverthe-
less, it is worth noting that the U.N. resolutions were not weighed as evidence
or considered a source of customary law, which to a certain extent is striking
given their weight in Filártiga.139 Also, the Second Circuit in Kiobel took the
fact that international courts and tribunals lacked jurisdiction over corporations
as evidence that international law does not recognize corporate responsibility,
which is inaccurate.140 It is submitted here that the issue of jurisdiction should
be set apart from the issue of responsibility. Although the International Court
of Justice ultimately decided in East Timor that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
charges against Australia, the court clearly affirmed the erga omnes character
of the country’s alleged breach of obligation—“the erga omnes character of a
norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things.”141 It was
on this distinction that Judge Leval concurred in judgment with the Second Cir-
cuit in Kiobel, but strongly dissented from the majority’s position on corporate
v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), granted rehearing en banc by Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated on rehearing by John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
134 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
aff’d by 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
135 Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
136 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d,
Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
137 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
remanded to In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
138 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 147 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 456 F. Supp 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
139 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
140 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127.
141 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 ICJ Rep. 90, ¶¶ 28–29 (June 30).
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responsibility. Leval noted that international law “leaves all aspects of the issue
of civil liability to individual nations” and that “there is no rule or custom of
international law to award civil damages in any form or context, either as to
natural persons or as to juridical ones.”142 Yet, Judge Leval continued, “[t]he
fact that international tribunals do not impose criminal punishment on corpo-
rations in no way supports the inference that corporations are outside the scope
of international law and therefore can incur no civil compensatory liability to
victims when they engage in conduct prohibited by the norms of international
law.”143
Moreover, another point of divergence concerns extraterritoriality of the
ATCA; an aspect made relevant because the suits concerningwrongs done abroad
are of a much different nature than those historically under the ATCA jurisdic-
tion. In granting the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court in Kiobel af-
firmed the Second Circuit’s holding that the ATCA offered no exception to the
“presumption against extraterritoriality.”144 The Court held such presumption
necessary for the protection “against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord.”145 The ma-
jority decided that claims should “touch and concern the territory of the United
States …with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”146 Furthermore, they opined, “corporations are often present in
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices.”147 The decision has already impacted lower courts, who have inter-
preted Kiobel to bar causes of action under the ATCA that are based solely on
“conducts occurring in the territory of another sovereignty.”148
It appears that the ATCA may constitute a mechanism available to victims
of human rights abuses by corporations in a very limited number of cases. To a
great extent, the Act’s ambivalent application reflects the dynamics of the emer-
gence of a norm clearly requiring corporations to respect international human
rights, and the progressive crystallization of the scope of such a norm. To an-
other extent, however, it reflects the U.S. courts’ apprehension in holding cor-
porations accountable to international human rights standards for wrongs com-
mitted abroad, and in many cases done complicity with local governments. The
American judiciary’s apprehension is to a certain degree caused by the fact that
no courts in other states abroad have exercised such a jurisdiction and foreign
governments have often objected, sometimes as amici curiae, to the exercise of
such a jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.149 It seems the crystallization of an obli-
gation upon TNCs to respect human rights and the further clarification of the
142 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 Id.
144 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013).
145 Id. at 1661 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
146 133 S. Ct., at 1669.
147 Id.
148 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
149 See, e.g., In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
denied reconsideration by Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 300 (2d Cir. 2007),
judgment aff’d by American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
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content of such an obligation, like that promoted by the UN, could eventually
be realized through case law under the ATCA if courts are enabled to enlarge
the range of norms that trigger jurisdiction under that Act. However, the issue
of extraterritoriality will likely remain an obstacle, insomuch as the ATCA is a
unique statute to the United States, without equivalence in other countries.
H Conclusion
This Article reviewed the role played by the U.N. resolutions in fostering the de-
velopment of a norm of general character that establishes the TCA responsibility
to respect international human rights law. It was shown that such a norm might
eventually acquire the nature of an international legal principle in the sense that
article 38 of the ICJ Statute has. Also, the effort carried out by the U.N., ILO,
and OECD in giving normative content to that responsibility was catalogued.
This content seems to derive from an inductive reasoning applied to specific sit-
uations, and from a deductive approach applied to human rights instruments. As
John Ruggie affirmed, the task is less of one creating new law and more of one
developing an understanding of how existing law applies to TNCs by taking full
consideration of the manner and impact their activities have on human rights.
The Article does not suggest that a legal norm establishing the TNC responsi-
bility to respect international human rights has completely emerged, and least of
all that it is fully operative. Rather, the Article posits that there is strong evidence
that such a norm is in the process of formation, and that it is progressively ac-
quiring normative content through the work of different bodies. The U.N., with
its universal character and the constitutional nature that may be attributed to
its Charter, has played a major role to this end. Clarification of the scope of the
human rights obligation has evolved and will continue to evolve together with
the development of the obligation itself, and this includes, at a minimum, the
International Bill of Rights and the ILO’s Declaration of Principles and Rights
at Work.
Finally, this Article reviewed the role played by regional human rights courts
and national courts in indirectly or directly holding TNCs subject to violations
of international human rights law. Regional human rights courts have clearly
promoted the development of the field, albeit indirectly, by affirming state obli-
gations to enforce specific rights in private relations. Finally, the Article also
reviewed the main legal barriers for holding TNCs to IHRL. It singled out as
main barriers the international judicial organs’ lack of jurisdiction over transna-
tional corporations and the jurisdictional impact upon national courts applying
international law, including the resistance by U.S. federal courts to extend their
jurisdiction extraterritorially over actions carried out abroad.
